Constitution Act, 1867 — Distribution of Legislative Powers
Primary constitutional text setting federal and provincial institutions and division-of-powers context relevant to why secession cannot be accomplished by ordinary provincial law alone.
Last evidence check means this project’s automated public-repository check; it is not a government audit, regulator audit, external audit, or assurance engagement.
Source statusJustice Laws Website, Government of Canada source record checked 2026-05-06
Review trailSource usage is tied to public topics and claim records in the repository.
Source typeofficial
Topics using source3
Claims referenced4
Why this source matters
Supports claims that Confederation is a constitutional order involving federal and provincial actors, not only a single provincial electorate. This record currently supports 3 topics and 4 claims in the public repository.
Evidence details
This source row records the publisher, source type, reliability label, access date, original URL, and any archive copy available to this project.
001quebec-secession-referenceA clear referendum result would not be self-executing independence and would not let a province dictate final secession terms unilaterally.002quebec-secession-referenceThe strongest pro-independence reading is that a clear Alberta mandate could create democratic legitimacy and negotiation pressure, while the strongest anti-independence/pro-federation reading is that lawful secession would still require negotiated constitutional change.003indigenous-treatiesFederal jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" means reserve lands and federal Crown obligations would require constitutional or negotiated treatment rather than unilateral provincial transfer.004indigenous-treatiesThe strongest anti-independence case is that treaty continuity, section 35 protection, reserve lands, consultation, and consent are unresolved threshold issues, not implementation details.